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Resumo 
No processo de  reforma agrária brasileiro é comum a redistribuição de terra ocorrer por meio 
de invasões das grandes proprieades pelos sem terra. Esse mecanismo introduz 
insegurança no direito de propriedade fundiária e, na Regîão Amazônica, tem como 
consequência o excesso de desflorestamento. Esse trabalho utiliza    um jogo não-
cooperativo para mostrar que   as interações estratégicas entre proprietários e posseiros em um 
contexto instittucional onde as  florestas naturais são consideradas como recursos de livre 
acesso implicam o excesso de desflorestamento. A principal implicação analítica  do modelo é 
que a taxa de desflorestamento de determinada área tende a aumentar com o  número de 
posseiros na área.  Essa implicação é confirmada quando testada em um painel de dados 
censitários municipais da   Amazônia brasileira no período 1970-96 e esse resultado se 
mantem mesmo quando se controla o problema da  endogeneidade do número de posseiros na 
especificação de uma equação de desflorestamento. Da perspectiva ambiental, portanto, o 
resultado permite questionar os mecanismos utilizados pelas políticas de reforma agrária no 
Brasil. 
Palavras-chaves: reforma agrária, desflorestamento, insegurança dos direitos de propriedade, 










Rio Branco – Acre, 20 a 23 de julho de 2008 
Sociedade Brasileira de Economia, Administração e Sociologia Rural 
 
2 
In Brazil, the land reform involves redistribution of land plots from large landowners to 
squatters. It generates property rights insecurity which alters land uses and fosters forest 
depletion. In this paper, a non cooperative game model is developed where natural forests are 
considered as an open access resource and the strategic interactions between landowners and 
squatters lead to an over deforestation. The main theoretical implication is a positive impact 
of squatters on deforestation. It is successfully tested on a panel data set covering the 
municipalities  of the Legal Amazonia controlling for the endogeneity of squatters in a 
deforestation equation. The result questions the modalities of the Brazilian state-led land 
reform 
Key Words: Land reform, Deforestation, land tenure insecurity, panel estimation. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Deforestation rates of Brazilian Amazonia in the last decades have been alarming. 
According to Landsat satellite images, annual deforestation from 1978 to 2004 was 20,000 
km
2
The factors of deforestation in the tropical zones and more specifically in Brazil have been 
the subject of many theoretical and empirical studies (e.g.  Bhattarai and Hammig, 2004; 
Binswanger, 1991; Margulis and Reis, 1991; Pfaff, 1997; Geist and Lambin, 2001). The 
usually considered causes of deforestation are related to the development of transport 
infrastructures, agro-pastoral activities and logging industry profitability, income level and 
inequality, demographic pressure (Barbier, 2001; Andersen, Granger, Reis, Weinhold and 
Wunder, 2002; Koop and Tole, 2001; Walker, Moran, and Anselin, 2000). Studies also 
highlight the role played by the macroeconomic environment: the economic growth, the debt 
burden, the real exchange rate, etc. (e.g. Barbier and Burgess, 2001; Foster and Rosenzweig, 
2003). In addition, institutional factors and more specifically poorly defined property rights 
appear to play a key role in the deforestation process (Angelsen, 1999; Deacon, 1994; 
Mendelsohn, 1994). Weak property rights discourage investment in long-live assets, such as 
forest, that don’t yield immediate returns. When property rights are poorly defined, or 
enforcement is lacking, capital intensive land uses are discouraged against non capital 
intensive activities like cattle ranching. Governments thus should aim, via land reform or 
other means, at setting up a property right system that favors sustainable land uses (Sikor and 
Muller, this issue).  
 on average. As a percent of geographic area, deforestation increased from 3% in 1978 to 
14% in 2004.  
Paradoxically in Brazil, the state-led land reform increases land tenure insecurity. The 
Land Statute of 1964 that constitutes the institutional background for land reform allows 
farmers without titles who make an “effective use” of the land to claim its holding. Land 
reform thus consists in expropriating and compensating landowners and distributing land to 
settlers. As a consequence landless farmers are prompt to occupy large and underdeveloped 
landholdings and to clear the forest since deforestation is usually considered as a proof of land 
development. Land reform also creates incentives for landowners to clear the forest in order to 
protect their rights in land.  
Land reform in Brazil exacerbates property rights insecurity on forestland and natural forests 
can be considered as open access resources. Forestlands are the subject of an overexploitation 
resulting from the competition between landowners and squatters for land access. In this 
paper, the strategic interactions between landowners and squatters are described in a non 
cooperative game model that delivers two major restrictions: the total number of farm holders 
and the relative number of squatters have both a positive effect on deforestation. These 
implications are tested on a panel data set constituted by the municipalities of the Legal 
Amazonia.  
Section 2 sets up the background of the study. Section 3 develops the theoretical model of 
deforestation. Section 4 presents the panel data analysis that is carried out on the Legal 
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2.  THE LAND DISTRIBUTION PROCESS IN BRAZIL 
A large number of agricultural establishments are cultivated by farmers who do not 
possess any legal land tenure (squatters or posseiros). According to the agricultural censuses, 
squatters held in the seventies about 48 % of the farms in the Brazilian Legal Amazonia 
(BLA). The share of squatters then decreased from 35 % in 1985 to 26 % in 1995. In 1995, 
squatters are particularly numerous in the states of Maranhao, Amazonas and Acre, where 
they represent, respectively, 43%, 33% and 30% of the farms (Table 1). 
Table 1. Number of agricultural establishment held by squatters in percentage of total 
establishments 
    1970  1975  1980  1985  1995 
Acre  AC  46  45  44  45  30 
Amazonas  AM  47  67  46  39  33 
Amapá  AP  43  69  55  75  23 
Goiás  GO  22  30  5  5  5 
Maranhão  MA  52  49  38  38  43 
Mato Grosso  MT  30  30  22  18  10 
Para  PA  47  49  41  34  16 
Rondônia  RO  44  29  51  28  8 
Roraima  RR  23  95  91  43  11 
Tocantins  TO  47  46  30  19  13 
Total BLA    48  49  39  35  26 
Source: IBGE. BLA: Brazilian Legal Amazonia 
The Land Statute of 1964 (Estatuto da terra) gives the landless peasants the right to settle 
on undeveloped public or private lands. According to a subsequent law adopted in 1980, 
squatters who have been developing an area of land during five consecutive years without 
opposition of landowners, can claim formal property title over this area. If squatters are 
evinced, they can obtain compensation on behalf of landowners for all improvements made to 
the lands. Moreover, the 1988 Constitution and the Agrarian Law of 1993 stated that 
unproductive establishments may be taken over and redistributed to landless and rural 
workers (Fearnside, 2001). The Brazilian land reform institute (INCRA: Instituto Nacional de 
Colonizaçao e Reforma Agraria) is in charge of landowners’ expropriation and land 
redistribution. 
Until the mid eighties, land redistributions were scarce. They consisted mainly of 
installations of families on public lands within the framework of colonization projects. Land 
redistributions increased at the end of the eighties, and resulted mainly from squatters’ 
invasions of large private holdings, rather than public lands, and ex post legalization. The 
number of expropriation and settlements by INCRA has been increasing significantly from 
the mid nineties with the development of occupations of large private landholdings by 
landless peasants organizations (Pacheco, 2006) in particular the MST (Movimento dos 
Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra).  
This process of land redistribution generates property rights insecurity on land plots that 
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Constitution doesn’t provide a clear definition of underdeveloped land. In practice, 
forestlands are considered as unused so that landowners are encouraged to clear the forest to 
prevent squatters’ invasions. The state-led land reform thus exacerbates conflicts between 
landowners and squatters (Alston, Libecap and Mueller, 2000) and fuels deforestation.  
Figure 1 highlights two phenomena concerning deforestation. First, the deforestation rate 
of landowners is generally higher than the deforestation rate of squatters who own smaller 
farms.
1
Figure 1. Land cleared by landowners and squatters in percentage of farm area  
 This result is corroborated by other studies (e.g. Fearnside, 2005; Pacheco, 2006). It 
can be regarded as the consequence of scale economies in logging activities. Second, a 
positive correlation links deforestation rates of landowners and squatters that can result from 
common factors affecting deforestation of both types of agents (cattle ranching profitability, 
infrastructures…). But these two stylized facts can also be the consequence of landowners’ 











Source: IBGE, Agricultural censuses, 1985, 1995 
3.  STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS BETWEEN LANDOWNERS AND SQUATTERS 
Angelsen (2001) develops a game theoretical model to study strategic interactions in land 
appropriation between the State and local communities. In this section, a similar model gives 
some pieces of explanation to the stylized facts depicted above (Figure 1). It is argued that 
excess deforestation is the result of strategic interactions between landowners and squatters 
who compete for open access forestlands.  In the first model, farm holders choose 
simultaneously the level of deforestation (Cournot-Nash model). In the second one, a 
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temporal asymmetry is introduced with a leader and a follower: the landowner starts clearing 
forest and then the squatter goes on deforestation (Von Stackelberg model).
2 These models 
deliver two main econometric restrictions that are tested in section 4.
3
 (a) The Cournot-Nash model 
 
(i) The private equilibrium 
Consider an exogenous number of A farm holders i (i = 1, …, A) and a plot of forested 





i + = ∑
=1
), or can be left as a 
natural forest (N): 
                  (1) 
Clearing forest secures property rights so that F
i i ∀  ( = 1… A) is a private land whereas N 
is an open access land.  
The one-stage non co-operative game is analyzed where each agent chooses F
i 
simultaneously with F
j (j ≠ i) treated as exogenous. Each agent maximizes her profit (π
i
( ) ( ) F ~ , F C N , F R max i i i i i
Fi − = π
): 







~ and j ≠ i     (2) 
F ~ denotes the other agents’ total forest clearing. Taking into account equation (1) the problem 
thus becomes: 
( ) ( ) F ~ , F C F ~ F T , F R max i i i i i i
Fi − − − = π   i ∀ =1, …, A        (3) 
The natural forest is assumed to generate receipts from non-timber forest products: food 
products, oils, latex, fibbers, medicines… Natural forest also maintains soil fertility of cleared 
areas through nutrient, micro-climate or hydrological effects (Peters, Gentry, and 
Mendelsohn, 1989; Moegenburg and Levey, 2002; Durieux, Machado, and Laurent, 2003). 
Consequently the receipt function R
i(.)
 of the agent i depends positively on the cleared forest 
area and on the natural forest. The function is assumed to be twice differentiable with respect 




(.) is separable between natural and 
cleared forest: 
,  0 ≤ i
FF R ,  0 > i
N R ,  0 ≤ i
NN R ,  0 = i
FN R ,  i ∀  = 1, …, A      (4) 
Deforestation generates a (first) local negative externality. Indeed, when agents cut forest, 
natural forest becomes scarcer and its value or implicit price ( i
N R ) increases. It is a “natural 
forest scarcity effect”. This mechanism reduces the incentive to cut forest for the agent i and 
is described by a non negative cross derivative  0 ≥ i
F ~ N R . 
                                                 
2 The game developed by Alston, Libecap, and Mueller (2000) between landowners and squatters, enlightens the 
relationship between deforestation, land reform policies and violent conflicts. 
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(.) of the agent i represents the clearing costs. It is assumed to be 
twice differentiable, increasing, and convex in forest clearing: 
,  0 ≥ i
FF C    i ∀  = 1… A              (5) 
The cost function is assumed to depend not only on the own agent’s level of deforestation 
but also on the other players’ one. Other externalities are thus introduced in the game through 
the cost function. Their effects are given by  i
F ~ F C , the second cross derivative between agent’s 
i forest clearing and other agents’ forest clearing. 
Indeed, deforestation may facilitate the penetration of other agents into the natural forest 
generating a local positive externality for agent i whose clearing costs are reduced. It is a 
“frontier effect” with  0 < i
F ~ F C . Bringing new plots into cultivation induces investments in 
transport infrastructures which costs are shared by local authorities or by the State. Individual 
costs of deforestation are thus reduced. However, this frontier effect may vanish in the 
presence of an “agricultural land scarcity effect” (Angelsen, 1999) that is a (second) local 
negative externality. The latter may occur in a situation where an agent starts clearing the 
most profitable plots of land for agricultural and pasture purposes in so far as these plots are 
relatively more fertile, more accessible, etc. This rises up agent i’s clearing costs and  i
F ~ F C  is 
positive. The net effects on agent i’s cost of other agents’ deforestation are thus a priori 
ambiguous.  










In the following, the scarcity effects are supposed to dominate the frontier effect. Indeed, 
economically profitable areas are limited by the lack of infrastructure supply, the soil fragility 
of cleared lands, the importance of flooding areas, the prevalence of diseases, etc. These 
viable areas are thus characterized by an intensive competition for land access and the natural 
forest in these areas is the subject of an intense depletion.  
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Under the assumption that the players share the same characteristics, the unique Cournot-
Nash symmetric equilibrium is stable when the slope of the response function of the agent i is 
less than 1 in absolute value (sufficient condition, e.g. Tirole (1990, 220)). 
The Cournot-Nash symmetric equilibrium is located in C  (Figure 2) where the response 
function of the player i  ( ) F G














j i F A F
1 1
1
 A = 1, 2… where: 
   i ∀  = 1, …, A and j ≠ i        (6) 
A positive exogenous shock in the marginal profitability of deforestation induces an 
increase in the deforestation rate equilibrium. Moreover, when the number of farm holders 
increases, the symmetric condition line rotates clockwise around point O. Hence, the Cournot-
Nash deforestation rate equilibrium is a positive function of the number of farm holders. 
(ii) Pareto optimal solution 
The Pareto optimal level of deforestation is found by choosing the level of deforestation 
(F) that maximizes total profit: 
( ) ( ) F C N , F R max







          (7) 
The unique Pareto optimal solution is independent of the distribution of the deforestation 
rate between the farm holders and of the number of farm holders. Hence, the optimal solution 
is the curve EE’ of which slope is –1 (Figure 2). It lies below the reaction function except at 
the point E. At E secure property rights guarantee the exploitation of the plot of the forest area 
by a sole agent and so all receipts and costs are internalized.
5 For the other points, the optimal 
amount of deforestation is smaller than the level of deforestation in the Cournot Nash 
equilibrium. The level of overexploitation increases with the number of the players giving rise 




(b) The Von Stackelberg model 
Consider again the competition for land in Amazonia taking into account the temporal 
asymmetry between the landowner and the squatter. The squatter can invade the part of the 
landowner plot that is not cleared. The landowner reacts to this threat by choosing 
                                                 
4 In the more general asymmetric case, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is located on the reaction function  ( ) F G
~  
where it intersects the reaction function of the other player. 
5 Under the assumption that all externalities are private and can be addressed through secure property rights. 
6 This expression is preferred to the so-called Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968). See for instance: Balland 
and Platteau (1996); Feeny, Berkes, McCay, and Acheson (1990) or Bruce (1998). The theory of optimal 
depletion of a natural resource establishes that overexploitation of an open access resource is exacerbated by the 
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preventively and strategically the level of deforestation.
7  The squatter has Cournot 
conjectures: she assumes that the landowner will not change her level of forest clearing in 
response to her own choice. The landowner makes rational conjectures: she anticipates the 
response of the squatter to her own deforestation level. Under these hypotheses, the game is 
sequential: at first, the landowner (the leader) maximizes her profit (cf.  equation  2) and 
chooses a level of deforestation F
l, then the squatter (the follower) observes F
l and chooses 
F
s
The threat of invasion in the natural forest urges the landowner to clear more forest. By 
this way, she generates negative externalities that reduce the squatter’s forest clearing 
profitability. When the squatter clears less, the natural forest becomes more abundant and, its 
value or implicit price for the landowner (
. This framework constitutes a Von Stackelberg model.  
l
N R ) decreases: the landowner clears more. The 
landowner deforestation can be interpreted as sunk costs that deter the squatter’s entry. 
Indeed, their commitment value signals that the squatter’s invasion will not be profitable. The 
landowner deforestation can even prevent invasion if the squatter supports a fixed entry cost 
in the plot of land. The landowner may choose F
l
The response function G(F
 that reduces the squatter’s profit to zero. 
l) of the squatter and the landowner’s isoprofit curves are 
depicted in Figure 3. The symmetric Cournot-Nash (with two agents) and Von Stackelberg 
equilibria are respectively C (intersection between G(F
l
The slope of the squatter’s response function being less – 1 (stability condition of the 
Cournot Nash symmetric equilibrium), an increase in the landowner’s deforestation yields an 
increase in total deforestation even if the squatter reduces his own deforestation. Hence the 
threat of the squatter’s invasion induces an overexploitation of the forest because of the 
defensive strategy of the landowner. Moreover, it is straightforward that an exogenous shift in 
the squatters’ response function, for example a modification in the socio-economic 
environment that facilitates the squatter’s entry, yields an increase in landowners and total 
deforestation rates (Figure 3).  
) and the first bisecting line) and S (the 
landowner chooses the point on the squatter’s response function that maximizes her own 
profit). When compared to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the landowner clears more whereas 
the squatter clears less. This result is supported by descriptive statistics that show higher 
deforestation rates by landowners (Figure 1). The landowner’s profit is greater in the Von 
Stackelberg case. Moreover, in this model where the response functions are downward 
sloping, the landowner’s profit is always greater than the squatter’s profit. Indeed, the leader 
can make a preventive move that reduces the follower’s entry profitability (Gal-Or, 1985). 
                                                 
7 The temporal asymmetric between agents is predetermined. Hence, the question of choosing roles is ignored 
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4.  ASSESSING THE INFLUENCE OF SQUATTERS ON DEFORESTATION: 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
(a) The data set 
The main sources of data are the agricultural censuses (Censo Agropecuario) realized in 
1985 and 1995 by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE: Instituto 
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica). The data are collected for each agricultural 
establishment which can be a household or a firm, private or public, with different land tenure 
status: landowner, tenant, sharecropper or squatter. Data are aggregated at the municipal level 
and the sample used in the econometric analysis is restricted to the municipalities of the Legal 
Amazonia.
8
Following Andersen, Granger, Reis, Weinhold, and Wunder (2002), the proxy for 
deforestation is the land cleared for agro-pastoral purposes. Cleared land is measured as the 
areas used by the agricultural establishments for annual or perennial crops, planted forests or 
pastures, short and long fallows. The remaining areas are considered as non cleared: natural 
forests, natural pastures, non usable lands. Cleared land is divided by the MCA area (cleared 
land) and is presented in Table 2.  
 Changes in the number and area of municipalities required to group the 763 
municipalities in 258 Minimum Comparable Areas (MCA) for consistent comparisons in 
time. The panel set is thus constituted by 516 observations. 
                                                 
8 Legal Amazonia  includes the states of Rondonia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Para, Amapa, Tocantins, Mato 
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Table 2. Cleared land in percentage of the state area (cleared land) 
  1970  1975  1980  1985  1995 
Acre  1  1  3  3  5 
Amazonas  0  1  1  1  0 
Amapá  0  1  1  2  1 
Goiás  21  35  46  48  54 
Maranhão  16  19  26  29  21 
Mato Grosso  3  6  10  13  22 
Pará  3  3  6  7  7 
Rondônia  2  2  4  7  17 
Roraima  0  0  1  1  3 
Tocantins  9  12  17  22  26 
Total BLA  3  4  6  8  10 
Source: IBGE 
The most deforested areas are located in the states of Goiás, Tocantins, Maranhão and 
Mato Grosso which cover the “arc of deforestation” along the southern and eastern edges of 
Legal Amazonia.  
Only 79% of Legal Amazonia is naturally forested (cf. Andersen, Granger, Reis, 
Weinhold, and Wunder (2002, chapter 2)). For instance, in the southern and eastern parts of 
Legal Amazonia, the land is naturally covered with savannah and agricultural conversion 
cannot be considered as deforestation. To deal with this potential source of bias another 
measure of deforestation is used. Cleared land is weighed by the share of naturally forested 
land in each municipality (corrected cleared land). Municipalities that are not naturally 
forested are excluded from the sample.
9
(b) Econometric modeling approach and econometric findings 
 The econometric results obtained with this variable 
are shown in appendix II for robustness tests.  
The explained variable is Cleared land. Explanatory variables are Nbets, the number of 
agricultural establishments in the MCA and Squatters  defined as the ratio of agricultural 
establishments hold by squatters over the total number of agricultural establishments. 
According to the model, these variables have a positive effect on deforestation. Control 
variables are real gross domestic product per capita  (Gdpp) and its square. This specification 
is consistent with a deforestation Kuznets curve (Barbier and Burgess, 2001; Barbier, 2004). 
The GDP data are expressed in 2000-Reais using the national accounts implicit GDP deflator. 
Gross domestic product is estimated by the Institute for Applied Economics Research (IPEA: 
Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Applicada).  
The econometric estimation is driven in three steps: 
- Ordinary Least Squares estimation (OLS) where all observations are pooled; 
- Panel Least Squares estimation (PLS) with double fixed effects that control for 
municipal and temporal heterogeneities; 
-  Panel Two-Stage Least Squares estimation (PTSLS) with double fixed effects and a 
control for the endogeneity of Squatters 
                                                 
9 The naturally forest cover data come from IBGE. We consider as naturally forested land, the areas of low 
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Table 3. Estimation results (explained variable: Log[cleared land]) 
  OLS (1)  PLS (2)  PTSLS (3)  PTSLS (4)  PTSLS (5) 


















































Log(cattle price)        0.43** 
(2.06) 
 
Number of observations  516  516  516  472  516 
Adjusted R²  0.17  0.91  0.85  0.78  0.91 
Fixed effects 
(Cross-section/Period F p-value) 






















Exogeneity test (p-value)      0.0001 ***  0.00 ***  0.06 * 
Suridentification test (p-value)          0,91 
t-statistics (in parentheses) are robust to observation specific heteroskedasticity in the disturbances (White diagonal correction).  
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The OLS estimation (Table 3: 1) displays a negative and significant correlation between 
Cleared land and Squatters. Obviously, this result does not allow concluding that squatters 
have a negative impact on deforestation. Indeed, two sorts of biases can be suspected. 
Significant explanatory variables which also affect Squatters might be omitted. For example, 
economic policies changes at the federal level (liberalization of the agricultural sector) or 
international price variations may have an impact both on deforestation and on the number of 
squatters. Moreover time invariant municipality characteristics (geographical and physical) 
may also affect both Cleared land and Squatters.  
The PLS estimation (Table 3: 2) includes MCA and temporal fixed effects that are jointly 
significant. The coefficient of Squatters is not statistically different from zero. This result 
suggests that the OLS estimation bias induced by omitted variables is negative. There may be 
a positive correlation between the number of squatters and the distance of the municipality 
from the main urban centers. Indeed it may be easier for squatters to claim land in remote 
areas where land is cheaper and property rights harder to enforce. In the same time, the 
profitability of deforestation decreases with the distance from the main urban centers (Alston, 
Libecap, and Schneider, 1996). 
The PLS estimation does not support the theoretical restriction that Squatters  have a 
positive and significant impact on Cleared land. However, this result could be the 
consequence of the simultaneity bias between Cleared land and Squatters. Indeed, according 
to the theoretical model, deforestation is a defensive strategy of landowners against squatters’ 
settlements. In order to correct this bias,
10
The instrumental equations (Table 4) highlight the positive and significant effect of 
Church and Public on Squatters. It is assumed that public and churches’ establishments have 
the same technology and incentives to clear the forest as other agricultural establishments. 
The Church variable is thus considered as a pertinent instrument which only has an indirect 
effect on deforestation through the Squatter variable.
  Squatters  is instrumented by the number of 
agricultural establishments owned by churches (Church) and by public entities (Public) 
divided by the total number of agricultural establishments in the MCA. The Church variable 
is considered as a proxy of the influence of the church in the MCA. In Brazil, churches and 
especially the Catholic Church play an active role in defending the interests of landless people 
(Carter, 2002). In 1975, the Catholic Church created the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT: 
Comissão Pastoral da Terra), which supports the action of various landless movements. The 
CPT defends the land reform, denounces landowners’ violence against squatters and provides 
material and legal assistance to squatter camps. In 1984 CPT actively participated to the 
foundation of the Brazil’s Landless Workers Movement (MST). Moreover, the Church has 
sometimes distributed lands to the poorest (Rodriguez, 2004).  
11
                                                 
10 The instrumentation also protects against the consequence of omitted pertinent variables which are correlated 
with the relative number of squatters. For instance, squatters may be characterized by a high time preference that 
could fuel deforestation. Hence, the instrumental variable must be uncorrelated with squatters’ characteristics 
 Concerning the Public variable, it is 
11 It can be noticed that there is no statistical link between the density of population and the relative number of 
church owned agricultural establishments. Hence, this instrument does not catch a demographic effect and (or) 
an urbanization effect on deforestation. Moreover the church and public variables cannot be suspected to be 
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assumed that the enforcement of property rights in public establishments is weaker than in 
private ones. Public establishments are potentially more the subject of squatters’ invasion. 
The introduction of Public is also motivated by the possibility to test the overidentification 
hypothesis. 
Table 4. Instrumental equations (explained variable: Squatters) 
  PLS  PLS 




















Public    0.91*** 
(15.14) 
Cross-section and period Fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
     
Number of observations   516  516 
R²  0.77  0.88 
t-statistics (in parentheses) are robust to observation specific 
heteroskedasticity in the disturbances (White diagonal). 
The Nakamura and Nakamura test (Table 3: 3 to 5) rejects the exogeneity of Squatters and 
the test of Sargan (Table 3: 5) does not reject the null hypothesis that the overidentification 
restriction is valid. 
The effect of Squatters on deforestation in the PTSLS equations (3) and (5) becomes 
positive and significant whatever the instrument list. The magnitude of the marginal impact of 
Squatters on deforestation is different according to the instrument list but remains positive 
and significant. According to the PTSLS estimations there exists a positive causal influence of 
squatters on deforestation. Table 5 below shows that deforestation responds strongly to a 
decrease in the relative importance of the squatter ratio.  
Table 5. Predicted effect of a reduction in Squatters on Cleared land 
Squatters  Cleared land 
Absolute difference  Absolute difference  Elasticity 
- 0.10  - 0.07  0.82 
To calculate the effect of an increase in the ratio of squatters on deforestation, the explanatory variable is set to 
its mean value in 1985 (0.35) and reduced to its mean value in 1995 (0.25). The explained variable is set to its 
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The theoretical model also predicts a positive relationship between the number of 
agricultural establishments (Nbets) and Cleared land. The estimated elasticity of deforestation 
with respect to the number of agricultural establishments lies between 0.44 and 0.59.  
The control variables Log(Gdpp) and Log(Gdpp)
2  deliver a non linear effect of the 
development level of the MCA on deforestation. The turning point is relatively high and only 
7% of the observations are higher. This result does not differ from existing empirical 
literature which generally refers turning point estimates that are significantly higher than 
average income levels (Barbier and Burgess, 2001). For most observations, an increase in 
Gdpp has a positive impact on deforestation: a 1% increase in Gdpp implies a 0.39% increase 
in deforestation. This positive impact can be interpreted as the consequence of the 
improvement in infrastructures that is tightly correlated with economic development. 
Infrastructure is a major source of deforestation as shown by numerous studies (e.g. 
Andersen, Granger, Reis, Weinhold, and Wunder, 2002).
12
In Amazonia, cattle ranching is considered as a main factor of deforestation and an 
increase in the profitability of this activity is expected to promote deforestation. The cattle 
price is introduced in the PTSLS equation (Table 3: 4) to take this effect into account. This 
price is supposed to be exogenous i.e. local markets are supposed to be integrated to the 
national market. In this case, controlling for the double fixed effects implies that the 
variability of cattle prices catches idiosyncratic transaction costs, e.g. transport costs, between 
local exporting markets and a central market. A cattle price increase thus corresponds to a 
decrease in transport costs that generates an increase in the profitability of cattle ranching and 
favors deforestation. The variable Log(cattle price) has a significant and positive impact on 
deforestation and does not affect the other coefficients. 
  
The results are also robust to a more restrictive definition of deforestation that drops out 
municipalities that are not naturally forested (Corrected cleared land). The results remain 
qualitatively unchanged (see  appendix II). 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, land reform is put forward as a driving force of deforestation in the Brazilian 
Amazonia. In Brazil, state-led land reform mainly consisted in redistributing unused privately 
owned plots to farmers without titles. Land reform thus creates property rights insecurity on 
naturally forested lands that are considered as unused.  
A game theoretical model stresses the indirect influence of land reform on deforestation 
through strategic interactions between landowners and squatters. In this framework, 
landowners clear the forest to prevent squatters’ settlements and squatters clear the forest to 
gain formal property rights. Econometric findings exhibit a positive causal relationship of the 
number of squatters towards deforestation. Squatters not only directly contribute to 
deforestation but also indirectly: the threat of squatters’ invasions incites landowners to clear 
more. 
                                                 
12 Deforestation may generate income streams that are taken into account in GDP measures. Nevertheless, gross 
domestic products depend on the overall economic activity. We thus assume that the exogeneity of Gdpp may be 
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This model is obviously a simplification of complex relationships between numerous 
factors involved in the deforestation process. However the results evidence a  limit of the 
Brazilian state-led land reform which can raise environmental concerns. Land reform may be 
promoted on equity and efficiency grounds. But, a legal framework which implicitly 
recognizes deforestation as a proof of land development is socially costly. Environment 
preservation imposes to recognize that natural forest is not an “ineffective” use of land.  
These results may also support a market-based approach to land reform, which relies on 
negotiations between willing buyers and sellers. Beneficiaries choose the land that best suit 
their needs and negotiate its price.  Such an experiment was conducted in 1997 in five 
Northeast states but was severely criticized by landless peasants movements. Although this 
mechanism has the advantage of not fueling deforestation process, MST put forward the high 
cost to land access borne by the beneficiaries in this system..    
Appendix I 
(a) The Cournot-Nash model 
(i) The private equilibrium 
Let us consider the first-order necessary (FONC) and second order sufficient (SOSC) 










F           (8) 





FF          (9) 
The first two terms of the first order condition (equation 8) give the receipt of an extra unit 
of forest clearing. It is equal to the difference between the marginal receipt of agricultural 
land (or pasture land) and the marginal receipt of natural forest. This difference is assumed to 
be positive. The third term is the marginal cost of forest clearing.
14
The FONC shows that there exists an implicit relationship between the deforestation of 
agent i and the deforestation of other agents written: 
 
( ) F ~ G F i i = . G
i is the response function 
of the agent i. The existence of G
i is guaranteed by the implicit function theorem and the 
SOSC (equation 9). The slope of G
i
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) F F C N F R N F R

























 is obtained by the total differentiation of the FONC: 
          (10) 
                                                 
13 If F
i maximises π
i, then a global and unique maximum is reached provided that the objective function is 
strictly concave. 
14 In other words the marginal profit of clearing is equal to the natural forest’s implicit price ( i
N R ). This is a 
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The sign of the denominator is negative (SOSC). Thus, the slope of the response function 
depends on the sign of the numerator: 
( ) ( ) ( ) N , F R F ~ , F C sign
F ~ d






− − =  
The numerator is positive when there is an “agricultural land scarcity effect” ( 0 > i
F ~ F C ) 
and a “natural forest scarcity effect”  0 ≥ − i
NN R . In that case, the response function is 
downward sloping: the more the other agents clear the forest, the less agent i clears. Forest 
clearing decisions are then strategic substitutes. When the “frontier effect” ( 0 < i
F ~ F C ) 
dominates the two scarcity effects, the numerator is negative and the response function is 
upward sloping. An increase in forest clearing by other agents implies that clearing the 
remaining forest becomes more profitable for i (in other words, forest clearing decisions are 
strategic complements).  
(ii) Pareto optimal solution 
Let us consider the first-order necessary (FONC) and the second order sufficient (SOSC) 
assuming that there exists a unique interior solution: 
FONC:  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 = − − F C N , F R N , F R F N F            (11) 
SOSC:  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 < − + F C N , F R N , F R FF NN FF           (12) 
(b) The Von Stackelberg model 
The FONC for the landowner is: 
















  is the slope of  the response function of the squatter. If local negative externalities 
predominate, the slope is negative. Compared with equation (8), the first order condition in 






N F R , −  is added.
15
                                                 
15 In the FONC derivation, it is assumed that the squatters’ deforestation in period 2 does not influence the 
landowner’s cost in the first period: 
 The receipt of an 
extra unit of forest clearing increases.  
( ) 0 , = s l l
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Table 6. Estimation results on reduced sample (explained variable: Log[Corrected cleared 
land]) 
  OLS  PLS  PTSLS 






























Number of observations   191  191  191 
Adjusted R²  0.21  0.92  0.88 
Fixed effects 
(Cross-section/Period  F P-value) 




Instrument list      Log(NBETS), Log(GDPP), 
Log(GDPP)², CHURCH 
Exogeneity test (P-value)      0.01*** 
t-statistics in parentheses; *: significant at 10 % level; **: significant at 5 % level; ***: significant at 1% level 
Table 7. Instrumental equations on the reduced sample (explained variable: Squatters) 
  OLS 
Constant  0.39 
(0.55) 
Log(Nbets)  0.00 
(0.00) 
Log(Gdpp)  -0.03 
(-0.27) 
Log(Gdpp)²  -0.05 
(-0.65) 
Church  11.50*** 
(3.28) 
Number of observations   191 
R²  0.82 
t-statistics (in parentheses) are robust to 
observation specific heteroskedasticity in the 
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